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Abstract
This paper argues that, as far as the investment behavior of non-financial corporations is 
concerned, the apparent continuity over the last four decades suggested by the corporate 
financialization label is misleading. Indeed, while the disconnection between profitability 
and investment is a robust stylized fact for most of the period, with cumulative detrimen-
tal consequences for labor, we contend that the underlying mechanisms changed mean-
ingfully at the turn of the millennium. This contribution identifies—empirically and the-
oretically—two distinct successive corporate financialization regimes (Mark I and Mark 
II) and explains their evolutionary articulation. Financialization Mark I is characterized 
by the empowerment of financial actors: in a context of high interest rates and full-blown 
liberalization, diminishing retained earnings by non-financial corporations resulted in a 
dramatic slowdown of investment. Contrastingly, Financialization Mark II is characterized 
by a strongly established financial hegemony with new forms of intellectual and financial 
monopoly. In this configuration, interest rates are low and global value chains are deeply 
seated. This fuels rampant deflationary pressure, which changes the overall dynamic of the 
profit-investment nexus. Then, in Financialization Mark II, contrary to what occurred dur-
ing Financialization Mark I, distributed profits are the consequence of slow investment.
Keywords Financialization regimes · Investment-profit nexus · Payout · 
Globalization: Intellectual monopoly · Asset managers
1 Introduction
The four last decades exhibited a puzzling concomitance of macrotenden-
cies. Except for the United States (US) in the second half of the nineties, most 
developed economies experienced disappointing performances in terms of GDP 
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and productivity growth; investment was generally lackluster, but profitability 
improved, and stock market valuation skyrocketed at a historical high in 2020, in 
the middle of a pandemic.
This period was also characterized by a meaningful change in corporate 
governance. After decades of relative managerial autonomy, the share-
holder value orientation (SVO) progressively asserted the primacy of 
equity holders among other stakeholders on legal and economic grounds. 
This followed a sharp rise in real interest rates after the generalization 
of restrictive monetary policies by central banks in the name of the fight 
against inflation at the turn of the eighties. In the meantime, a vast move-
ment of internal and external liberalization of financial operations drasti-
cally increased financial assets’ liquidity.
Overall, these self-reinforcing changes resulted in a new assertiveness of the 
claims of the financial community (banks, financial institutions, investment funds, 
and ultimate owners of assets…) and in a weakening of labor position, which suf-
fered an increasing commodification and a relative devaluation vis-à-vis capital.
This evolution was dubbed, with many nuances, financialization (van der Zwan 
2014). In addition to the commodification of multiple aspects of everyday life 
and the increasing penetration of financial motives, the disconnection of profits 
and accumulation has been a central issue in the literature (Durand and Gueuder 
2018; Stockhammer 2004).
Here, the emphasis is on non-financial corporations’ investment behavior 
and, in particular, the intricacies of what the literature refers to as the SVO 
(Aglietta 2000; Froud et  al. 2000; Lazonick 2017; Lazonick and O’sullivan 
2000). This paper deals with this specific dimension of financialization that 
we define as a shift in the uses of profits by non-financial corporations at the 
expense of overall productive investment. Our empirical inquiry covers the five 
biggest high-income economies (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) 
between 1980 and 2018. It consists of descriptive statistics built upon macro- 
and microdatasets, in order to grasp dynamics occurring both at the country 
level and at the largest global firm level.
We argue that, as far as the investment behavior of non-financial corporations 
is concerned, the apparent continuity over the last four decades suggested by the 
corporate financialization label is misleading. Indeed, while the disconnection 
between profitability and investment is a robust stylized fact for most of the over-
all period, with cumulative detrimental consequences for labor, we contend that 
the underlying mechanisms changed meaningfully at the turn of the millennium.
This contribution aims to identify—empirically and theoretically—two distinct 
successive financialization regimes (Mark I and Mark II) and explain their evolu-
tionary articulation.
We pick the year 2000 to distinguish between Mark I and Mark II. There 
is, indeed, a transition period between both financialization regimes; hence, 
the choice of this specific year for the caesura is to some extent arbitrary. In 
some respect, such as the institutional changes associated with the emergence 
of intellectual monopolies, Mark II started at least by the mid-1990s with the 
signature of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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Rights (TRIPS). Other features strengthened or became apparent since the 
Great Financial Crisis, such as rising concentration of equity funds, a grow-
ing importance of buybacks, and a sharper fall of the interest rate. Overall, we 
chose the year 2000 because it is a pivotal date along various dimensions that 
matters for our research. It signals the end of the digital economy boom in the 
US and the burst of the dot-com bubble, a sharp decrease of interest rates, the 
Doha agreement for global protection of intellectual property rights, and the 
entry of China into the WTO.1
Financialization Mark I received detailed attention from, among others, 
non-mainstream economists, sociologists, and geographers for the past quar-
ter of a century. It is characterized by the empowerment of financial actors: 
in a context of high interest rates and full-blown liberalization, diminishing 
retained earnings by non-financial corporations resulted in a dramatic slow-
down of investment with cascading negative effects for labor. Contrastingly, 
Financialization Mark II is characterized by a strongly established financial 
hegemony with new forms of intellectual and financial monopoly. In this con-
figuration, interest rates are low and global value chains are deeply seated. 
This fuels rampant deflationary pressure, which changes the overall dynamic 
of the profit-investment nexus. We argue that in Financialization Mark II, con-
trary to what occurred during Financialization Mark I, distributed profits are 
the consequence of slow investment, not the cause.
To elaborate on this argument, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 outlines the fields of literature that address the issue of sluggish invest-
ment in the corporate financialization era. Section 3 delineates conceptually the 
internal articulation of Financialization Mark I and Financialization Mark II and 
how they are evolutionarily related. Section 4 explains the operationalization of 
our categories and introduces our data sources. Section 5 presents descriptive sta-
tistics that document the continuities and differences of Financialization Mark I 
and II along several dimensions. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of these 
stylized facts and allows for a nuanced interpretation of the proposed conceptual 
framework.
2  Sluggish investment in the financialization era
For several decades, the literature has explored a wide array of debates about the 
disconnection between profits and investment in the context of financialization. 
As far as this paper is concerned, three dimensions are particularly relevant: 
(1) changes in corporate governance related to the rise of institutional inves-
tors and the affirmation of the primacy of the shareholder value; (2) changes in 
1 The data presented and discussed in the paper are based on the 2000 caesura. However, we calculated 
and provided in the Appendix data with an alternative cutoff in 2008. With this date, the empirical dis-
tinction between Financialization Mark I and Mark II still holds.
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competition regimes; and (3) changes in demand growth and the formation of 
new demand regimes.
2.1  The shareholder orientation of corporate governance and the rise of financial 
investors
Shareholder value is nothing more than the net present value expected by investors 
in financial theory (Fisher 1930; Modigliani and Miller 1958). However, since the 
1980s, the concept is used to legitimate changes in corporate governance both at 
the practical (Aglietta 2000; Froud et al. 2000) and theoretical level (Jensen 1986; 
Tirole 2006). In practice, it promoted a change in corporate strategies, shifting from 
a “retain and reinvest” model to a “downsize and distribute” model (Lazonick and 
O’sullivan 2000). From the beginning of the 1980s, the diffusion of this model was 
fostered by the rise of institutional financial investors and their empowerment as 
activist shareholders, first in the US and then in other rich economies (Gillan and 
Starks 2000; Jeffers and Plihon 2001).
From the 1970s on, a combination of various factors paved the way to what 
Hyman Minsky called “money manager capitalism” (e.g., Whalen, 2001). This 
multifold process of transformation of finance was unleashed by the deployment of 
asset management strategies oriented toward diversification in the 1970s (Montagne 
2013) and the tightening of global monetary conditions, following the “1979 coup” 
by the US FED (Duménil and Lévy 2004). A decade later, the dismantlement of 
capital controls accelerated the diffusion of the SVO in coordinated market econ-
omies like France, Germany, and Japan (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Lantenois 
and Coriat 2011; Morin 2000) and, more broadly, reinforced the power of finance 
due to the deepening of global liquidity (Orléan 1999).
High interest rates and the empowerment of financial investors resulted in a finan-
cial norm of high payouts to shareholders and a hurdle rate on productive investment 
projects (Boyer 2000). Empirical evidence from chief financial officer surveys’ indi-
cates that hurdle rates have been stable around 15% since mid-1980s (Sharpe and 
Suarez 2020). Some authors point to the increase in financial payouts and the con-
sequent reduction in retained earnings as the main driver of the diminishing ability 
of firms to invest (Duménil and Lévy 2004; Lazonick 2010, 2017). Others indicate a 
greater alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ preferences resulting in a greater 
emphasis on profitability over growth (Dallery 2009; Hein and Van Treeck 2010; 
Stockhammer 2004). Finally, some literature argues that outsourcing and offshoring 
of production support higher profits and payouts without investment in real assets 
(Auvray and Rabinovich 2019; Milberg 2008; Orhangazi 2018).
Empirically, the literature observes a negative correlation between investment 
in capital expenditures and financial payouts for the US (L. E. Davis 2018; Hecht 
2014; Orhangazi 2008; Van Treeck 2008), the UK (Tori and Onaran 2018), France 
(Clévenot et al. 2010), and the European Union (Barradas 2017). Contrastingly, the 
hypothesis that investment in capital expenditures is crowded out by investment in 
financial (e.g., Krippner 2005) is not corroborated as a general trend (Auvray and 
Rabinovich 2019; Rabinovich 2019).
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In addition to the direct consequences of institutional investors’ empower-
ment and shareholder value orientation on firms’ investment behavior, the internal 
dynamic of competition between financial investors also led to significant changes in 
the ownership of non-financial corporations. As will be exposed next, this transfor-
mation at the level of the overall ownership structure also affects firms’ investment.
2.2  Competition regimes
Compared to the “relatively quiet and uncompetitive 1960s” (Shleifer and Vishny 
1991, p. 54), the early 1980s were characterized by slowing inflation, high inter-
est rates, low profits, and increased foreign competition (Fligstein and Markowitz 
1993; O’Sullivan 2001; Stein 2010). Competitive pressures increased with European 
and Asian catching-up vis-à-vis the US and, more broadly, with the liberalization of 
trade and capital flows and the deregulation of internal markets. To some extent, this 
context of coerced competition compelled firms to invest to survive, but the destruc-
tive impact of rising overcapacities played a more prominent and detrimental role on 
global investment (Brenner 2004; Crotty 2003; Koo 2018; Mazier et al. 1984; Petit 
1999).
Intensifying competition characterized the beginning of the financialization era. 
However, since then a multidimensional process of monopolization gained steam.
In the early 1980s, the Bayh-Dole Act authorized US academic institutions to 
patent public-funded research results and to transfer this knowledge to private firms 
(Bok 2003; Orsi and Coriat 2006). This was the beginning of a massive process of 
knowledge enclosures that expanded globally via the WTO and trade agreements 
(Drahos 1995; Dreyfuss and Frankel 2014; Sell 2003, 2010).
Since the 2000s, empirical evidence shows that R&D efforts and the accumu-
lation of IPRs contributed to increasing profits and concentration (Calligaris et al. 
2018; Dernis et al. 2019; Lambert 2019; Orhangazi 2018; Schwartz 2016). In this 
context, Pagano (2014 p. 1413) coined the term intellectual monopoly capitalism to 
account for a new stage in capitalism where the distribution of profits is increasingly 
explained by the centralization of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and defined 
intellectual monopoly as the “legal monopoly over some items of knowledge, which 
extends well beyond national boundaries.”
In addition to the legal barriers built by IPRs, the rise of intangible assets and 
their economic properties (Corrado et al. 2012; Haskel and Westlake 2018) gener-
ated supplementary intellectual monopoly dynamics resulting from network effects, 
predatory practices in global innovation networks, the centralization of data, and the 
exploitation of differential returns to scale between in the context of value chains 
(Durand 2020; Durand and Milberg 2020; Foley 2013; Rikap 2020, 2021).
Overall, the detrimental effect of intellectual monopoly on investment is not lim-
ited to the fact that profits are channeled to firms largely protected from competi-
tion as it also prevents other firms to use and learn from privatized ideas and invest 
accordingly (Pagano and Rossi 2009).
Criticizing the recent literature on industrial concentration in the US, Davis 
and Orhangazi (2021) show that multiple trends and dynamics may be at work in 
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different industries. However, using industry average, their data do not exclude the 
possibility of polarizing dynamics related to intellectual monopoly to take place. 
Precisely, they accept that firms may be gaining market power through increased use 
of intangibles and hence higher profits. Corroborating this conjecture and its poten-
tial detrimental effects for investment, empirical studies show that intangible accu-
mulation is associated with market power that increases prices per unit of investment 
(Rabinovich 2020) and can be regarded as one possible cause of weak investment 
vis-à-vis profitability and valuation since the early 2000s in the US (Gutiérrez and 
Philippon 2016).
Besides, and with some overlapping with this intellectual monopolization, the 
transformation of the financial industry fueled a parallel dynamic of monopolization 
which is also considered to affect investment behavior.
Regarding asset management, the 2008 crisis has been the starting point of a huge 
centralization of savings in index funds and ETFs provided by the now Big Three 
asset managers, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors (Elhauge 
2015; Fichtner et al. 2017, Fisch et al. 2018, Bebchuk and Hirst 2019; Anton et al. 
2020, Fichtner and Heemskerk 2020). Their business model relies on expanding 
market shares thanks to low fees allowed by passive asset management and the dilu-
tion of fixed costs via economies of scale. They also took advantage of intellectual 
monopoly dynamics related to the development of “digital asset management plat-
forms” (Haberly et al. 2019).
As a consequence of savings centralization, portfolio diversification by these 
giant investors reaches such a point that they hold important shares in each of the 
companies of their portfolio. In the US, they collectively hold 20% in each of the 
S&P500 companies (Bebchuk and Hirst 2019). They also have important holdings 
in European and Japanese companies (Fichtner and Heemskerk 2020). This new 
trend challenges the short-term orientation of financial markets underlined by the 
literature because the exit option is not available for these investors that follow index 
composition changes. That is why Fichtner and Heemskerk (2020) label them “uni-
versal permanent owners.”
Analyses indicate that the interest of these investors relies more on sectoral per-
formance rather than individual firm performance (Anton et al. 2020; Antón et al. 
2016; Azar et al. 2019). Accordingly, they foster managers to restrain to invest to 
avoid the uncertainties of intra-industry competition and their possible negative 
effects on overall sectoral profits. Moreover, rents from monopoly pricing and the 
increasing output price per investment mechanically restrain incentives to invest.
2.3  Depressed demand growth and the formation of new demand regimes
The deep interconnection and reinforcement between the set of neoliberal policies 
and weak investment has been widely noticed in the literature and is linked to sev-
eral dimensions of the formation of demand regimes.
First, neoliberal policies implied a deteriorating income distribution given by a 
shift in power from labor to capital, both a de- (and also re-) regulation of various 
markets, a reduced direct economic involvement of the state given by privatization, 
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and a shift in monetary policy going from full employment to price stability (Stock-
hammer 2008; Vercelli 2015).
The gap between productivity and wages increased for most of the period at the 
expense of labor in the US (Fleck et  al. 2011; Lazonick 2014), but also in other 
OECD countries (Elgin and Kuzubas 2013; Erumban and Vries 2016).
Also for the US, Autor et  al. (2017) showed that the rise of “superstar firms” 
that concentrate sales and are less labor-intensive than others contributes to explain-
ing the fall in the labor share. Beyond the US, considering a group of OECD coun-
tries, Kohler et al. (2019) found that financial liberalization broadens exit options for 
firms and has negative effects on the wage share. More specifically, the negative link 
between wages and payout to shareholders was established for France, Germany, the 
UK, and the US (Alvarez 2015; Duenhaupt 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; 
Onaran and Guschanski 2018; Willman and Pepper 2020).
The impact on economic growth brought about by these distributive changes 
has been largely studied in the post-Keynesian literature built around the Bhaduri-
Marglin models. Most of these studies have found wage-led demand regimes for 
the countries considered in this article (Hein and Vogel 2008; Onaran and Galanis 
2014; Stockhammer et al. 2009). The combination of wage-led economic regimes 
with pro-capital distributional policies is what Stockhammer and Lavoie (2013) call 
“neoliberalism in practice”—in contrast with “neoliberalism in theory”—an unsta-
ble regime that has to rely on exogenous growth drivers.
This points to the second link between financialization and demand growth: 
recessionary tendencies were partly contained by external sources of demand. Gov-
ernment expenditures, consumer credit, residential investment, and exports (Girardi 
and Pariboni 2016) played a role: export-driven growth models characterize Nordic 
European countries while debt-driven appear more prominently in Anglo-Saxon and 
southern European countries (Hein 2012; Stockhammer 2009). Private debt has to 
some extent compensated for falling wages to support consumption patterns (Barba 
and Pivetti 2009; Frank et al. 2014).
In terms of public expenditures, their stagnation over GDP in OECD countries 
is a common feature since the 1980s up to the great financial crisis (Stockhammer 
2008). In the immediate aftermath, their surge has been too short-lived and insuf-
ficient to overcome stagnation tendencies (House et al. 2020; Kohler and Stockham-
mer 2020).
Besides the specific dynamics of government expenditures, consumer credit, resi-
dential investment, and exports, the liberalization of trade and international finan-
cial flows has added a high degree of volatility and uncertainty to the economy that 
worsens the overall picture for demand and investment (Arestis and Glickman 2002; 
Orhangazi 2008).
Overall, this rapid outlook on the literature indicates that, since the 1980s, three 
main factors have affected adversely—and unevenly in space and time—non-finan-
cial firms’ investment behavior. First, the empowerment of financial investors and 
the related shareholder value orientation. Second, monopolization dynamics related 
both to intellectual monopoly and a rapid concentration of ownership by gigantic 
asset managers. Third, more indirectly, the cumulative effects of neoliberal poli-
cies and the empowerment of shareholders have contributed to constrain workers’ 
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consumption, which depressed investment via the channels of managers anticipation 
and the formation of palliative sources of demand less favorable to investment.
The next section proposes a conceptual analysis of the transformation of these 
diverse dimensions of financialization and proposes an articulation of the shift 
between two distinctive phases or financialization regimes.
3  Payout as a cause then as a consequence of low investment: 
a stylized story of financialization
As far as the investment behavior of non-financial corporations is concerned, 
the apparent continuity along the last four decades suggested by the financializa-
tion label is misleading. Indeed, while the disconnection between profitability and 
investment is a robust stylized fact for most of the period, with cumulative detrimen-
tal consequences for labor (see Sections. 0 and 0), we contend that the underlying 
mechanisms changed meaningfully at the turn of the millennium.
This section outlines the conceptual framework we propose to explain the inter-
nal logic of two successive configurations of financialization. The labels Mark I and 
Mark II are freely adapted from the Schumpeterian literature on innovation (Malerba 
and Orsenigo 1995). It allows putting forward two distinctive logics contributing to 
a similar phenomenon, innovation in their case, profit without investment in ours.
The articulation proposed is highly stylized. However, it allows bringing together 
theoretical links that are usually set apart. Indeed, in addition to delineating the key 
defining relations of each regime, our conceptual framework proposes a theoretical 
Fig. 1  From Financialization Mark I to Financialization Mark II
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articulation to account for the evolutionary shift from Financialization Mark I to 
Financialization Mark II. As exposed in Fig. 1, Financialization Mark I and Mark II 
are two regimes of accumulation characterized by slow investment and high finan-
cial payments, but they differ in their internal logic although they are evolutionarily 
related.
Financialization Mark I received detailed attention for already a quarter of a cen-
tury (see Section 2). Financial deregulation paved the way for the rise of financial 
investors eager to extract payouts to maximize shareholder value in the short run. 
In this period, facing high inflationary pressure and widespread social unrests, the 
FED’s decision to raise its key interest rates constrained most of the central banks 
to follow, which unleashed the revenge of finance. The resulting rise of real interest 
rates weighed on firms’ internal finance. Moreover, high rates created a financial 
norm calling for higher distributed earnings to shareholders and acting as a hurdle 
rate to non-financial capital valorization.
This change of monetary conditions and the rise of a financial norm was a gen-
eral constraint weighting on non-financial corporations’ ability to fund their invest-
ment. This was all the more the case that competitive pressures grew tenser with 
industrial catching-up and the liberalization of trade and capital flows. Facing the 
primacy of a competitiveness agenda, management was more incentivized to focus 
on increased efficiency than on expansion.
In summary, in Financialization Mark I, the rationale of the surge in financial 
payments and the slowdown of investment responded to the combined influences of 
(i) the empowerment of financial investors at the expense of the unions, (ii) mon-
etary tightening, and (iii) growing competitive pressure. Another outcome of Finan-
cialization Mark I was the deterioration of workers’ bargaining power as a result of 
weaker labor demand and ongoing neoliberal reforms of the labor market and the 
welfare state. In turn, this contributed to depress investment through weaker con-
sumer demand.
In the meantime, competition between financial institutions to attract fund man-
agement resulted in a general tendency toward portfolio diversification. Market 
movements explain more than 95% of the stock returns of US defined benefits pen-
sion funds over 1990–2008 (Aglietta et al. 2012), and about two-thirds of US profes-
sional equity funds are outperformed by the S&P’s 500-Stock Index from the 1970s 
to the 2000s (Burton G Malkiel 1995; Burton G. Malkiel 2005; Burton Gordon Mal-
kiel 2019). Passive investment was consistently more profitable than active invest-
ment, which paved the way for the rapid development of mega index-tracking funds 
and the rapid consolidation of the sector.
At the institutional level, the deepening of marketization policies led to a more 
stringent definition and wider enforcement of IPRs and provided a generally sup-
portive regulatory framework for the unfolding of emerging digital industries.
Financialization Mark II emerges out of these transformations. This new struc-
tural configuration is also characterized by weak investment and a further deteriora-
tion of labor bargaining power. However, several key relations took new prominent 
importance.
First globalization. Liberalization of trade and investment and technological 
breakthroughs allowed for a spectacular increase in the fragmentation of productive 
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processes. The resulting mobilization of cheap labor in the global south under the 
control of mostly northern lead firms was perfectly consistent with the reluctance 
to commit capital for investment and contributed to further weakening labor bar-
gaining power and a deepening of the international intellectual division labor. The 
concentration of intellectual monopoly forces in the global north further entrenched 
lead firms’ market power, allowing them to serve generous financial payout to their 
shareholders.
In parallel, weakening investment was less and less able to absorb global saving 
while deep and flexible global value chains fueled rampant deflationary pressure. 
This contributed to pushing down interest rates and encouraged central bankers to 
adopt drastically accommodative policies.
These monetary conditions, radically distinct from the first age of financializa-
tion, relieved firms from the hardship of high-cost debt, inciting them to leverage 
these favorable terms to increase their payments to shareholders. Overabundant 
liquidity depressed returns and pushed investors out of bond markets and toward 
equities, which contributed to the reinforcement of centralized investors’ funds. At 
this level of ownership structure, the centralization of institutional ownership led to 
a new configuration where permanent universal investors at least partially control 
most of the listed firms. The extension of control through common ownership is 
essentially relevant at the sectoral level where funds can manage competition and 
limit investment to protect the overall quantity of profits.
With globalization, intellectual monopoly, and permanent universal investors, 
weak investment and high financial payments take place in a distinct economic 
logic. In Financialization Mark II, distributed profits are the consequence of slow 
investment, not the cause (as it was the case in Financialization Mark I).
During Financialization Mark I, high financial payout (payments to shareholders 
and interest) slowed investment due to the lack of internal funds. It was the empow-
erment of finance that drained retained earnings via interest payments and higher 
distributed profits. In Financialization Mark II, low investment and high payment 
to shareholders are symptomatic of a lack of sufficiently profitable opportunities for 
investment due to insufficient demand and monopoly power.
The rest of this paper will document to what extent this investment famine 
became the main driver of Financialization Mark II instead of the financial squeeze 
of firms’ internal funds, characteristic features of Financialization Mark I.
Table 1  Empirical dimensions 
of Financialization Mark I and II
Financialization I Financialization II
1980–1999 2000–2018
Investment Low Lower
Labor power Weak Weaker
Globalization Expanding High
Shareholders’ payments Expanding High
Interest payments High Low
Competition Competitive regime Monopoly
1 3
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To assess the distinction between both Financialization regimes, we present and 
discuss stylized facts related to the six dimensions delineated in Table 1. If our styl-
ized story is consistent and focusing on non-financial corporations, we should find 
that:
• The level of investment relative to profits further declined.
• Labor bargaining power cumulatively deteriorated.
• Payout to shareholders relative to profits expanded in the first period to attain a 
high level in the second.
• Globalization expanded, reaching a high level in the second period.
• Interest payments were high in the first but low in the second period.
• The competition regime dramatically shifted from generally increasing com-
petitive pressure to a new situation characterized by intellectually (intangibles) 
driven monopolization and financial ownership centralization.
4  Operationalizing our categories: scope, data, and sources
To map the contrast between Financialization Mark I and Financialization Mark II, 
we empirically analyze the changes in the six dimensions outlined in Table 1.
The term investment refers to the accumulation of productive (tangible and intan-
gible) capital by non-financial corporations. Labor bargaining power denotes the 
ability of workers to act collectively to set their income and to protect or improve 
their working conditions. Globalization refers to increasing trade relations, foreign 
direct operations, and international segmentation of productive processes. Share-
holders’ payments and interest payments refer to the two main forms of financial 
payments by non-financial corporations to financial entities. Finally, Competition 
refers to the configuration of the competitive struggle resulting both from opera-
tional forces and financial distribution of controlling stakes.
A difficulty in capturing these six dimensions results from the fact that finan-
cialization is a global phenomenon and not merely an international one. In a Bank 
of International Settlement (BIS) report, Avdjiev et al. (2018, p. 1) argue that the 
global reach of companies and ownership and the dispersion of economic activity 
(among others organized in global value chains) results in tension when it comes 
to data and policies, which are still determined at what the authors call “island” 
and “between islands” levels. The “island” metaphor refers to how the most used 
unit of analysis is the so-called economic area (a country, region or union). Starting 
from this perspective results in an approach to globalization in terms of transactions 
“between islands,” losing sight of dynamics occurring at the global level. Therefore, 
a growing tension emerges “between the nature of the economic activity and the 
measurement system.”
Since a global measurement system remains a blind spot, to partially overcome 
this tension, our analysis considered both macroeconomic level data and firm and 
ownership structure level data. This allowed us to move beyond methodological 
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nationalism without losing the national dimension which, despite globalization, 
remains a relevant unit of analysis.
We focused on the major developed economies, namely, the US, the UK, France, 
Germany, and Japan from 1980 to 2018. When data were not available for the 
full period, we used a shorter series. We built summary indicators to present styl-
ized facts in a condensed manner. The figures with full series were included in the 
appendix.
We are aware of the potential pitfalls involved in calculating averages from differ-
ent countries, considering their institutional and economic variegation. For this rea-
son, figures with country-level information are included in the appendix. Nonethe-
less, in line with our theoretical argument, these figures show that chosen countries 
tend to broadly conform to similar patterns for the selected variables. In the follow-
ing analysis, we mention and discuss the few exceptions.
4.1  Macroindicators at the country level
At the macroeconomic level, we used OECD, World Bank, National Accounts, 
FRED, the IMF, BIS, United Nations, the US National Science Foundation, and the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) data to build stylized facts for 
the different dimensions of analysis that we are using to distinguish between the two 
phases of financialization. For each dimension, Table A1 (Appendix 1) presents the 
indicators we built and their corresponding data source.
To assess the evolution of investment, we included an indicator of tangible capital 
accumulation (gross fixed investment for non-financial corporations as a proportion 
of gross operating surplus) and an indicator of intangible capital accumulation. We 
defined the latter as intellectual property assets between years t0 and year t-1 as a 
proportion of gross operating surplus in t0. A limitation of this variable is that we 
could only measure part of total intangible assets. Data on organizational capital 
and training was not available, so our intangible capital accumulation indicator only 
includes (i) computer software and database, (ii) entertainment, literary or artistic 
originals, and (iii) research and development.
In the case of labor bargaining power, we analyzed labor share—defined as the 
share of labor compensation in GDP—and unionization rates.
To study globalization, we tracked the evolution of trade as a percentage of GDP, 
imports from emerging and developing countries (1980–2018), and used Carballa 
et  al. (2020) index for the GVC participation rate in 1995 and 2011, due to data 
availability. This index is defined as the sum of the non-primary product portion of 
domestic value-added in exports plus intermediate imports over GDP.
Shareholder payments were tracked by considering the evolution of non-financial 
corporations’ net dividend payments and non-financial corporations’ listed shares 
redemption. Due to data availability, Japan’s series and 1990s figures for the US 
were proxied with the negative flow of listed shares issuance by non-financial corpo-
rations. In turn, we computed data for three variables concerning interest payments: 
the annual evolution of the real interest rate, non-financial corporations’ net interest 
payments, and credit to non-financial corporations.
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Finally, our competition data at the macroeconomic level is focused on the 
emergence of intellectual monopoly capitalism. We considered the annual evolu-
tion of non-financial corporations’ intellectual property assets as a share of total 
fixed assets, patents per researcher, and the ratio of the top 10 patent holders in 
total USPTO patents in 1995 and 2019. For patents per researcher, we used total 
researchers full-time equivalent for every country except for the USA since this vari-
able was not available. We used instead individuals employed in science and engi-
neering occupations. Additionally, we include information from the Executive Opin-
ion Survey of the World Economic Forum on executives’ opinion about the degree 
of intellectual property protection in their respective countries.
Summaries of all these variables with their corresponding sources and descrip-
tions are available in Appendix  1 (Table  A1) and Appendix 2 (Figures MAC1 to 
MAC15).
4.2  Firm‑level financial and ownership data
We complemented the macroeconomic information with data from non-financial 
listed firms using Compustat North America and Compustat Global. Although these 
firms represent only a minority of the total number of companies, they play a signifi-
cant role in all the dimensions we are covering.
We kept all active and inactive, publicly listed non-financial corporations incor-
porated in the counties we consider, excluding financial firms identified by the pri-
mary SIC codes from 6000 to 6799. We used different starting dates based on the 
quality and availability of the information: for the USA, since 1980, and for the rest 
of the countries, 1998. Therefore, comparisons between the Financialization Mark I 
and II are done on an end-of-period basis. We converted all the information into dol-
lars to add it up and compute all firms together.
Most of the financial information was retrieved directly from Compustat. This was 
the case of capital expenditures, operating income before depreciation, long-term 
debt, net payouts (purchase of common and preferred stock + cash dividends − sale 
of common and preferred stock), net interest payments (interest expense − interest 
income), intangible assets, and sales.
The only variable that was built rather than gathered directly was intangible 
investment, where we followed Peters and Taylor (2017, p. 256–257). It was calcu-
lated by adding two types of investment: organizational and knowledge investment.
For the European countries, a problem faced with the accounting data is that 
before the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005, 
many European firms did not separate spending on SG&A (Döttling et  al. 2017). 
Before that, year values are therefore artificially low. Since Japan adopted IFRS 
very recently (Tsunogaya et  al. 2015), we excluded it from intangible investment 
calculations.
We also used ownership information from Thomson Eikon to calculate the share 
of total outstanding stocks held by the “Big Three” (BlackRock, Vanguard, and 
State Street) among the ten most important shareholders in a replication of spe-
cific indexes for all countries—except Japan because we were not able to obtain 
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information. We ape the indexes S&P500 (for the USA), DAX30 (for Germany), 
FTS100 (for the UK), and CAC40 (for France) by taking the top 500, 30, 100, and 
40 firms by sales in each year for those countries respectively and calculated the 
ownership by Big3 in those firms. To further assess “Big Three” concentration, we 
compared their Equity funds (from Pension and Investment) to the world market 
capitalization (World Bank data), and to the total world equity funds (Financial Sta-
bility Board data).
Finally, to give a further account of digital concentration, we analyzed the public 
cloud computing market. We retrieved figures for the size of data stored in the pub-
lic cloud as a share of total data storage worldwide from IDC and market shares for 
top providers of public cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) from Statista. In the 
public cloud, firms and other organizations pay for what they use. Hence, market 
shares for IaaS can be considered as a proxy of data storage shares. We used these 
data to estimate the share of the data stored in each main public cloud provider vis-
à-vis global data storage. Due to data availability, we compared figures for 2015 and 
2018, both for the public cloud market shares and the shares of total data storage 
worldwide that is stored in the public clouds of the top three providers (Amazon, 
Microsoft, and Google).
With these various databases, we were able to build firm-level indicators related 
to all the dimensions discussed in this article except those involving labor bargain-
ing power and globalization. Information on employees and wages tends to be poor 
with many missing observations. Similarly, information on international activities is 
poor for the USA and non-existent for the rest of the countries. Anyway, this is not 
a significant limitation considering the availability of macroeconomic data for these 
same variables.
A summary of all these variables with their corresponding sources and descrip-
tions is available in Appendix  1 (Tables  A2-A3) and Appendix 3    (Figures 
MIC1–MIC9).
5  Tracking Financialization Mark I and Mark II
This section exposes the features exhibited by the descriptive statistics we compiled. 
They allow capturing the distinctiveness and similarities of Financialization Mark 
I and Mark II along the various dimensions we identified in our conceptual frame-
work: investment, labor bargaining power, globalization, corporate finance (share-
holder and interest payments), and competition.
5.1  Investment
The weakening in the investment-profit relation given by the alternative uses of 
funds at the expense of investment is maintained throughout Financialization Mark 
I and II. Fixed capital formation, using national accounts data, goes from 63.3% 
(1995–1999) to 59.4% (2000–2018) of gross operating surplus. Similarly, intellec-
tual capital formation decreases from 2.9 to 2.1% (Table 2).
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These broad averages hide some national specificities, especially the case of France 
who portrays a declining trend through Mark I but increasing during Mark II. In this 
case, the upward investment trend comes mostly from stagnant operating surplus. This 
can be linked to the creation of the Euro and the related lack of flexibility of exchange 
rates that dramatically affected France’s competitiveness (Clevenot et al. 2016).
In the rest of the countries, the ratio increases post-2010 but does not reach its pre-
vious levels (Fig. 1MAC). In the case of intellectual capital formation, it drops in the 
aftermath of the dot-com bubble in Germany, France, the UK, and the USA. However, 
before and after that point in time, trends are more stable than with capital formation, 
and differences, smaller (Fig. 2MAC).
Similar figures built with firm-level data indicate the same pattern and have a fur-
ther advantage, as it was discussed in the data section, of consolidating firms’ activi-
ties worldwide. The comparison, this time on a year vs. year basis, still indicates lower 
capital expenditures: 55.26% vs. 43.63% when all firms are considered and 61.34% vs 
42.59% when the average is computed on a national basis (Table 2).
In the case of intangibles’ investments, the firm-level data shows a higher investment 
in Mark I compared to Mark II contrary to macrodata. We can attribute this to several 
reasons. First, calculations are different: only intellectual capital is considered in the 
national accounts whereas the firm-level definition is broader (and also more impre-
cise) as it takes a percentage of SG&A for all firms. Second, R&D tends to be very 
concentrated in the larger companies with the top 10 firms spending 15%, top 50, 40%, 
and top 100, 52% of the total (European Commission 2019).
In any case, even if there is an increase in intangible investment due to the shift 
toward more intangible intensive economic processes and an increased assetization of 
knowledge, this rise is still modest and does not compensate for the decline of fixed 
capital investment. Overall, the trend of total investment (both fixed and intangibles) is 
clearly downward.
5.2  Labor bargaining power
A shared feature of Financialization Mark I and Mark II is the overall continuous 
weakening of labor position, which suffered an increasing commodification and a 
relative devaluation vis-à-vis capital (Table 3).
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Beyond the general trend, the share of labor compensation in GDP shows a clear 
downward trend for all our selected countries throughout both periods excepting 
for the UK (Fig. 3MAC). In this respect, Onaran and Guschanski (2018) found that 
social government spending has an important effect on wage share determination 
in the UK and France. In the UK, social government spending rose from 1998 until 
2013, which could at least partially explain labor’s share recovery.
Unsurprisingly, given the evolution of the wage share in both periods, unioniza-
tion shows a continuous downward trend (Fig. 4 MAC). The only exception was the 
case of Germany in the year 1990. However, it is already known that after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall Western Germany’s unions expanded into the east taking over mem-
bers from East Germany’s state trade union which explains the 1990 bump (Fichter 
1997; Schnabel and Wagner 2003). Since then, the unionization rate returned to its 
falling trend.
5.3  Globalization
Globalization has clearly expanded throughout the last decades as it is indicated in 
Table 4: all our chosen measures have higher averages in Mark II than in Mark I. In 
terms of international trade, not only levels are higher but also the rate of growth fol-
lowed a similar path. Except for the USA, the comparison between the starting and 
last year of Mark I and Mark II shows a higher increase for the latter (Fig. 5MAC). 
The highest increases, on the other hand, are verified in France and Germany as a 
result of the development and further integration of the European Union.
The expansion has also been higher in Mark II than in Mark I for imports from 
emerging and developing countries (Fig.  6MAC). The aforementioned entry of 
China into the WTO plays a major role in the explanation of this trend.
Table 3  Labor in 
Financialization Mark I and II
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For participation in global value chains, we only compared two specific years. 
As it is shown in Fig. 7MAC, the increase in Mark II is verified for all countries 
but is especially pronounced for Germany due to the expansion of its industrial 
value chains eastward as the European trading block that has become increasingly 
regional, especially since the 2000s (World Bank 2020). Likewise, Japan verifies an 
increase, also associated with the expansion of a regional trading block, but in this 
case the East Asian and Pacific one.
5.4  Corporate finance
Important financial payments characterize both Financialization Mark I and Mark 
II. The distinctive feature of Financialization Mark I is the high level of real interest 
rate and net interest payment. Once the fight against inflation was won, the decrease 
of interest rate and interest payments was offset by the rise in dividends and share 
buybacks from the mid-1990s onwards, while US institutional investors spread the 
shareholder value orientation in a world without capital controls.
As shown in Table 5, macrodata provide clear figures for the decreasing role of 
interest payments in the investment squeeze, with real interest rate declining from 
4.3 to 1.3% and net interest payments decreasing from 14.5 to 9.3% of gross operat-
ing surplus. However, macrodata indicates only a slight increase in net dividends’ 
payments, going from 18.3 to 20.4% of GOS. Adding share buybacks approximated 
by share redemption to net dividend payments, the total payout of cash to share-
holders increased from 23% of GOS in 2003 to 30% in 2018, which is much higher 
than the 1980s burden of interests. Such buybacks have been fueled by the growing 
leverage of non-financial corporations from 75 to 87% of GDP, made possible by 
Table 5  Corporate finance in Financialization Mark I and II
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low interest rates. Japan is an exception of this last trend explained by the burst of its 
asset price bubble at the beginning of the 1990s.
These numbers are very coherent with microdata, which show a strong rise in 
payouts to shareholders, from 6.4% in 1999 to 30.5% in 2018, while net interest pay-
ments decrease from 13.3 to 8.7%, the same orders of magnitude than macrodata.
Among the countries under consideration, the only outlier is France’s decrease of 
dividends in macroeconomic data over the 2010s (Fig. 8MAC). This evolution is not 
consistent with the evolution of payments to shareholders (Fig. 3 Mic) nor with data 
from other sources. Detailed discussion of accounting methods (Garnier et al. 2015; 
Husson 2015, 2020) indicates that the decrease in macrodata is a statistical artifact 
related to methodological changes at the statistical institute and/or new accounting 
practices by transnational corporations.
5.5  Competition
Financialization Mark I and Mark II exhibit different competition regimes. The lat-
ter is characterized by an increase in market concentration (see Fig. 6MIC): within 
each country’s top 500 non-financial corporations, the share of the sales of the top 
30 grows. This general average is also verified for all countries but Japan.
To account for intellectual monopoly, we considered several variables. At the 
macrolevel, we analyzed the weight of intellectual property assets in relation to total 
fixed assets (Table 6). We found that it increased significantly in the second period 
vis-à-vis the first one with the only exception of the UK (Fig. 13MAC). This could 
be due to a change in the relative importance of different types of intangibles mainly 
from software (which is included in Fig. 13MAC) toward organizational capital and 
training (whose figures are not available for all the countries; thus, we could not 
include them in Fig. 13MAC) (O’Brien 2018).
We also tracked the evolution of patents per researcher showing that the rate 
increased for Financialization Mark II, which indicates an acceleration of the pri-
vatization of knowledge production. At the global level, the ratio of the top 10 patent 
holders in total USPTO patents increased from 9.6% in 1995 to 10.7% in 2019. This 
suggests that privatization gets along with an increasing concentration of knowledge, 
as perceived by executives. Moreover, this is verified in all countries (Fig. 14MAC 
and Fig. 15MAC).
At the firm level, non-financial corporations’ intangible assets as a share of total 
assets steadily grow during Financialization Mark II for the 5 countries, going from 
9% in 1999 to 22% in 2018 (Table 6 and Fig. 7MIC). Within intangibles, the con-
centration of data stands out in Financialization Mark II. The public cloud comput-
ing business is a case in point. According to IDC, data stored in the public cloud 
represented less than 5% of the worldwide data storage in 2010. It jumped to 10% 
in 2015 and, by 2018, it was already around 20%. As the share of data stored in 
the public cloud grew, concentration in this market intensified. As a result, our esti-
mates indicate that the first three providers of infrastructure as a service on the pub-
lic cloud (Amazon, Microsoft, and Google) concentrated around 4.8% of the global 
data stored worldwide in 2015 and 13.5% in 2018.
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Finally, concentration at the market level and intellectual monopolization are 
accompanied in Financialization Mark II by concentration at the levels of ownership 
in comparison to Mark I. The share of ownership by the dubbed Big3 among the top 
ten institutional investors increases in each country (Table 8MIC). As expected, con-
sidering the literature (see Section 2.2), ownership concentration of the Big3 rises 
sharply for the US since the beginning of Financialization Mark II. It is followed 
by an increase in the UK figures and, since the 2008 crisis, the Big3 expand their 
share among the top ten institutional investors also in France and Germany. This 
concentration is the consequence of the concentration inside the financial industry: 
the Big3 equity funds rise from 35 to 38% of the world equity funds, and from 8 to 
12% of the world market capitalization between 2009 and 2018 (Fig. 9 MIC).
6  Concluding remarks
This paper contributed to the financialization literature concerned with non-financial 
corporations’ investment behavior and, more specifically, to the analysis of a shift in 
the uses of profits by non-financial corporations at the expense of overall productive 
investment. We advanced a new interpretation of the changing internal logic of this 
dimension of financialization since the 1980s in three complementary ways. First, 
Table 6  Investment in Financialization Mark I and II
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we distinguished two phases, namely Mark I and Mark II. Second, we proposed a 
conceptual articulation of their succession. And third, we documented the specific 
features of these two phases and the evolutionary process which supports them. We 
provided a wide array of descriptive statistics at the macro- and firm levels in sup-
port of our argument for the five biggest high-income countries and their listed firms 
for the period 1980–2018.
Our main argument is that during Financialization Mark I, the reduction of the 
share of profits used to invest is driven by pressure on firms’ internal funds due to a 
rising cost of debt, rising shareholder claims, and uncertainty related to intensifying 
competition. On the contrary, monopolization tendency characterizes Financializa-
tion Mark II. Growing monopoly power has a twofold origin. On the one hand, it is 
explained by market power in global value chains, centralization of intangible assets, 
and growing privatization of knowledge. On the other hand, it is also expressed in 
the centralization of ownership rights by institutional investors specialized in ETF 
and index trading funds. This monopolization turned upside down the logic of cor-
porate financialization. In Financialization Mark II, slow investment is the result of a 
lack of sufficiently profitable opportunities when it was the consequence of the lack 
of internal funds in the first period.
One important additional contribution is that we conceptualized this shift from 
Mark I to Mark II as the consequence of an evolutionary process through three main 
transformational dimensions. First, the empowerment of financial investors in the 
early phase paved the way to an internal competition within the financial industry 
that resulted in a very rapid concentration as a result of scale economies related to 
the implementation of portfolio diversification strategy. Second, sluggish investment 
favored an increasing reliance on foreign supplies in developing countries and a 
weakening of labor bargaining power which further depressed demand, constraining 
monetary authorities to adopt a very accommodative stance to try to stimulate eco-
nomic activity and contain financial instability. The international segmentation of 
productive processes also allowed for an increasing polarization of knowledge in the 
international division of labor. Third, deregulation policies contributed to depress 
demand—then investment—via the deterioration of labor position and favored 
increasing privatization, which legitimated the global expansion of IPRs, closing 
innovation possibilities and investment venues while securing rents for lead firms.
This general story is corroborated by the stylized facts we presented. However, 
several aspects must be refined, nuanced, and strengthened, opening a stimulating 
research agenda. First, our overall argument does not allow for institutional diver-
sity. This is related to our willingness to emphasize the global nature of the trans-
formation. Nonetheless, rhythms and positions in this transformative unfolding of 
financialization are uneven in terms both of countries, sectors, and firms. One can 
for example mention the case of France that did not follow the general pattern of 
decreasing investment (as a share of profits) since the 2000s.
Another limitation of this article is that the plausibility of our story and the styl-
ized facts we provided do not exhaust possible interpretations. For example, we 
emphasized the lack of growth opportunity in Mark II in comparison to Mark I. 
However, the fact that the financial constraint was relaxed in Mark II—with very 
accommodating credit conditions—does not preclude the possibility that growth 
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opportunity was also missing in Mark I. To what extent both the absence of growth 
opportunity and strain on internal funds could have been combined in Mark I should 
be the object of future investigations. Whatever the answer, our point is that the 
decline in interest rates and increasing monopolization indicate that the lack of 
growth opportunity, relatively to the strain on internal funds, is a more important 
factor in Mark II than in Mark I. This limitation suggests nonetheless that further 
empirical exploration of the reversal of the causal links we proposed would be a 
welcomed follow-up of this paper.
This follow-up investigation could also include the evolutionary effect of corpo-
rate taxing systems and tax havens favoring monopolization and corporate financial-
ization. For example, the most profitable firms and intangible intensive US firms 
tend to keep their offshored savings in US treasury and corporate bonds, collecting 
financial rents and taking debt in the US to pay to shareholders (Bryan et al. 2017; 
Pozsar 2018). This leads to an effective regressive corporate tax structure (Hager 
and Baines 2020), with far reaching consequences for policy making and competi-
tion dynamics.
Moving beyond listed corporations, future investigations could integrate venture 
capital and start-ups into our framework. Two interrelated phenomena should be 
considered. On the one hand, large corporations’ acquisitions have pervasive effects 
on venture capital generating what Kamepalli et al. (2020) dubbed a “kill zone.” On 
the other hand, it is worth noting that big corporations2 and major individual share-
holders from big tech corporations are engaging in venture capitalism (Bradshaw 
and Thomas 2020).
Finally, future research should also consider the place of China in the overall pic-
ture we have presented. While some of the features of this story seem to fit for China 
as well (such as the rise of intellectual monopoly capitalism), others are the other 
side of our story (for instance, the effects of globalization).
In terms of policy implications, considered in isolation, financial reforms such as 
corporate governance reforms, changes in dividends taxation, or financial regula-
tion will not be enough to deal with the mounting contradictions resulting from four 
decades of an increasingly loose relation between profits and investment. To tackle 
the issue of the inadequate level of investment vis-à-vis profits and, incidentally, the 
issue of its quality (among others considering ecological effects), both regulation 
and/or control over intellectual and financial monopoly and the buildup of invest-
ment planning capabilities need to be considered, taking into account their interna-
tional ramifications.
Neoliberalism was a success of capitalist classes as marketization, privatization, 
and light-touch regulation of finance contributed to drastically rebalance bargaining 
power in their favor, at the expense of labor. However, as Marx early on observed, in 
its thrive toward universality, capital “encounters barriers in its own nature” (Marx 
1858, sec. Notebook IV – The Chapter on Capital). The transformations of corpo-
rate financialization from Mark I to Mark II illustrate this tendency. The unfolding 
2 For instance, Amazon provides Amazon Web Services credit to promising startups as a form of ven-
ture capital (Amazon 2020).
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of financialization created new internal obstacles to the process of capitalist accu-
mulation. Tackling them and promoting a sustainable and just mode of development 
will require to move beyond monetary, fiscal, or regulatory policies and to retool 
states’ capacities in order to allow public action in the realm of production.
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